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THE CHILCOT REPORT AND THE LAW 
 
Introduction 
 
Questions of law permeate the Chilcot Report. All are shrouded in uncertainty. From 
the constitutional relationship between Prime Minister, his Cabinet and Parliament to 
the legality of going to war, the Inquiry presided over by Sir John Chilcot touched 
upon many controversial legal issues. It resolved none. But then, it was not a court of 
law or a judicial inquiry and never pretended to be. No one could have reasonably 
expected it to pronounce with conviction any judgement on the lawfulness of acts and 
decisions made by those who took the UK to war in Iraq. Instead, the Report provides 
information useful for those who wish to reach such judgements. Lawyers are already 
searching the vast document to inspire possible litigation, though that was not the 
concern of the Inquiry. It was supposed to determine what happened and learn 
lessons. Those were its very broad terms of reference.   
 
But did the Inquiry deal effectively or properly with the legal issues which framed 
many of the decisions and actions it examined? In this article I look briefly at two key 
areas where law had particular relevance but, it is argued, received insufficient 
attention: the legal basis for going to war; and the conduct of the occupation after the 
initial hostilities were concluded. Both involve the application of international legal 
standards, a slippery subject for those seeking exactitude but valuable for judging the 
political and military leaders nonetheless.  
 
 
The Law and the Decision to go to War  
 
Sir John Chilcot said in the presentation of the Inquiry’s report that he and his 
colleagues had examined whether it was right and necessary to go to war. But being 
right and necessary and being lawful are not the same thing. Why then did the legality 
question matter so much, to the exclusion, for many, of any moral judgement? The 
Chilcot Report unpicks the story.  
 
From the moment when it became apparent that full scale military invasion of Iraq 
was planned, the issue of legality was central to both the war’s justification and its 
opposition. The intricate details of international law and UN Security Council 
Resolutions quickly became common currency in popular debate in the protracted 
run-up to war. Where once international law was the preserve of a small band of 
lawyers talking mostly amongst themselves and rarely entering the public 
consciousness, now everyone was an expert. Even the Attorney General, Lord 
Goldsmith, was required to pronounce on the subject even though his legal experience 
hardly gave him the necessary expertise. A legally correct decision seemed vital, 
nonetheless, perhaps because the law offered a sense of objective propriety when 
many in the UK supported ridding Iraq of Saddam Hussein but were uncertain about 
how and when this could be done.  
 
Given the very public question about the legality of any proposed intervention, the 
matter developed into an irritating technical barrier for those intent on war. As Chilcot 
makes clear, all those advocating invasion, from Tony Blair down, sought legal 
endorsement for their plans. The lawfulness question was never simply ignored, as it 
was more effectively by the US administration. This may have been the instinctive 
reaction of a trained barrister, as Blair was, or prompted by clearly articulated (as 
Chilcot highlighted) military concerns that liability might flow from the UK’s then 
recent acceptance of the International Criminal Court’s jurisdiction. But whatever the 
motivation, once international law became relevant, its limits on the use of force had 
to be seen to be, if not actually, satisfied. These stipulated that military action against 
another sovereign state would only be lawful if either an act of self-defence or 
sanctioned by the UN Security Council. There was also a much less certain possible 
justification where intervention was a response to a humanitarian catastrophe, as had 
applied in the Kosovo action of 1996. But no one, particularly FCO lawyers, pursued 
this line seriously as Blair’s communications with Bush made clear.1  
 
Self-defence lacked credibility as well. The threat purportedly posed by the Saddam 
regime (directly through weapons of mass destruction or indirectly through imagined 
support for terrorist organisations) and presented to Parliament and the UN General 
Assembly (as well as the media), did not provoke UK government ministers to seek to 
justify war on such grounds. The arguments about deployment of weapons within 45 
minutes may have entered folklore (and is given particular short shrift by Chilcot), but 
never gained legal traction in vindicating the war. No court, if any had been available 
to judge on the matter, would have treated such claims seriously anyway.  
 
So, if international law was to play a part, justification had to be sought on the basis 
of UN Security Council resolutions. The Chilcot Report plods its way through the 
various machinations and arguments about reviving the original Resolution that 
authorised the first war against Iraq in 1990 (the ‘revival doctrine’).2 As this was even 
less convincing than the self-defence claim, in mid to late 2002 Blair and his advisers 
pushed to go back to the UN and obtain a new resolution. UNSC 1441 was the result.  
 
The story of the differing advice at home from the FCO legal advisers and those in 
New York engaged in the negotiations about the draft, show how uncertain the ‘law’ 
appeared even for so-called experts. But the consensus after the resolution was passed 
was that it too was unsatisfactory: it failed to be explicit about military intervention in 
the event that Saddam did not comply with the requirements to dispose of the now 
mythical weapons of mass destruction and allow UN weapons inspectors to confirm 
Iraq’s cooperation in this endeavour. The Report emphasises the tortured path the 
British government followed, trying to persuade the US to go back for a second 
resolution to gain the explicit support of other members of the Security Council 
(France, Germany and Russia in particular). That proved impossible.  
 
The Report then tells how, during this inconclusive diplomatic process, Lord 
Goldsmith produced various legal advices that were, at best, ambivalent and worst, 
self-contradictory, to remedy the apparent absence of UN sanction for an already 
planned invasion. Chilcot’s remarks on this element of the story are themselves 
confusing. The Report avoids any determination (even a lay person’s view) that the 
war may have been unlawful. It merely suggests that more definite and balanced 
advice should have been provided to Cabinet and Ministers immediately prior to 
making the final decision to invade in March 2003. Though it makes the point that 
war should have been the last resort and peaceful options had not been exhausted, 
there is no condemnation on legal grounds. The Inquiry panel were simply 
unqualified to make that call. 
 This will disappoint many who hoped the ‘law,’ whatever that might mean in this 
imprecise context, would provide an unequivocal focus for damning Tony Blair and 
his inner circle as a prelude to some kind of personal criminal sanction. Chilcot has 
given no succour to such demands. In truth he has done no more than confirm the 
practical unenforceability of international law in the matter of UK foreign affairs.  
 
Presciently, that was the conclusion of a UK court which looked at the matter before 
hostilities, but does not appear to enter Chilcot’s analysis. At the end of 2002, 
assuming that war had already been decided upon, CND brought a judicial review 
against the Prime Minister requesting the courts to provide an interpretation of UNSC 
Resolution 1441.3 They wanted an advisory declaration stating that the UK and USA 
could not go to war on the terms of that resolution alone; it would instead require 
more explicit authorisation through a second resolution. The court refused to interfere. 
It concluded that it ‘had no jurisdiction to declare the true interpretation of an 
international instrument which has not been incorporated into English domestic law’. 
It also declined to assess the matter on the basis that it ‘would be damaging to the 
public interest in the field of international relations, national security or defence’, and 
would tie the hands of the UK government in its negotiations at the UN and in its 
cooperation with the USA. Somewhat embarrassingly now, it concluded that ‘[t]here 
is no sound basis for believing the government to have been wrongly advised as to the 
true position in international law. Nor, in any event, could there be any question here 
of declaring illegal whatever decision or action may hereafter be taken in the light of 
the United Kingdom’s understanding of its position in international law.’ In other 
words, if the British government says military action is lawful, then the domestic 
courts are in no position to disagree. 
 
The Chilcot Report unwittingly underpins this pessimistic reading of the force of law. 
In this context, law is a plaything of government. The Report may highlight the 
unsavoury and dubious process by which law can be (and was) practised at the heart 
of government, but it offers little to suggest future decisions will be and should be 
tested for their legality before being made and implemented.  
 
Ultimately, there is no rule book which the UK government can follow without one 
being constructed by Parliament. In that void, there is only legal opinion and 
argumentation. No one, not least Lord Goldsmith, had any definitive interpretation of 
resolutions and circumstances that could not be challenged or spun, even now. That is 
a reflection on the nature of law, and particularly international law, in state practice 
and one which Chilcot might well have observed.  
 
The Law and Occupation 
 
The decision to go to war is a matter of high politics. Those involved are exclusively 
senior politicians, civil servants and military commanders. Lesser ranks simply do as 
commanded. But when it comes to the actual fighting and post-war occupation, 
political/military strategy and ground level actions begin to co-mingle. Strategy is 
supposed to shape the culture of an intervention as well as individual and unit 
behaviour.  
 
Law reflects this distinction. Allegations of a crime of aggression are a command 
matter and treated wholly separately from how a war is conducted. Breaches of 
international rules governing warfare and hostile occupation (the law of armed 
conflict) may lead to prosecutions of individual soldiers responsible but if those 
breaches are widespread and frequent, commanders may also have to answer charges 
that they sanctioned a deliberate plan of abuse or knowing abuses were possible or 
occurring failed to prepare or respond adequately.  
 
The Inquiry knew that there were multiple and serious allegations of breaches of the 
laws of war by UK forces in Iraq from 2003 until 2009. And yet in contrast to the 
detailed examination of whether a war was pursued against international law norms, 
the Report is complacent when it comes to assessing the issues of military conduct in 
Iraq.  
 
This is only partially explained by the decision of the Inquiry to restrict its terms of 
reference. The Report makes clear why the Inquiry did not consider allegations of 
abuse of Iraqi civilian detainees by UK forces. It notes that investigations are on-
going, that there have been two public inquiries into specific cases of abuse (Baha 
Mousa and Al Sweady), that lessons about detention and interrogation have been 
learned, and that any further investigation by the Inquiry would overlap and perhaps 
prejudice these processes.4  
 
That makes sense so far as it goes. But matters of tactical operation in terms of the 
military policing effort after initial hostilities had ended, including the treatment of 
civilian detainees, are viewed as largely unconnected to post-conflict planning and 
operation. Perhaps there were fears that warranted expressions of deep respect for the 
soldiers serving in Iraq would have to be qualified should the ill behaviour of some be 
repeated. But the omission allows those at the heart of government and the armed 
forces off this particular legal hook. There is insufficient analysis of the preparations 
(or absence of them) to respect the fundamental principles of those conventions (of 
Geneva in particular) that try to limit the injurious effects of military action. Equally, 
there is no consideration of the possible institutional culture in the armed forces as 
regards its attitudes to the liberated Iraqi population. This manifests itself, as the 
Report reveals obliquely, in two areas: the response by the military to predictable 
lawlessness as war turned to occupation; and the detention and interrogation of 
civilians.  
 
The former is a matter the Report does mention. It notes that the risk of lawlessness 
was identified by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Defence Intelligence 
Staff before the war began.5 Tony Blair and senior civil servants ‘had recognised the 
seriousness of that risk.’ But no Rules of Engagement for the post-conflict occupation, 
dealing with lawlessness, ‘were created and promulgated before UK troops entered 
the country.’ There was an absence of instructions for ground troops to follow which 
senior military knew well. ‘Faced with widespread looting,’ the Report says, ‘after the 
invasion, and without instructions, UK commanders had to make their own 
judgements about what to do.’ The Inquiry heard from Brigadier Graham Binns that 
‘“the best way to stop looting was just to get to a point where there was nothing left to 
loot”’.6 
 
This did not reflect approaches on the ground, as reference to some of those cases that 
the Inquiry failed to examine would have revealed. The infamous ‘Camp 
Breadbasket’ case, where a British Army unit caught alleged looters, subjected them 
to humiliation and ill-treatment (stripping the men naked and forcing them to simulate 
anal sex and strapping others to the forks of a fork-lift truck), and photographed the 
scene, suggested that some army units had resorted to unlawful ‘punishment’ for 
alleged looters. Two junior soldiers were convicted for the abuse but alleged that they 
were acting on the orders of more senior officers.  
 
Camp Breadbasket was not an isolated case. Other investigations, one recently 
conducted by the Iraq Fatalities Inquiries into the death of Ahmed Jabbar Kareem Ali, 
a 15 year old boy, again suspected of looting, taken by an army unit and forced into 
the Shatt al Arab waterway to drown as the soldiers looked on, have found evidence 
that such treatment of suspected looters had become an accustomed tactical method, 
well-known at Brigade level in Basra, for dealing with the overwhelming numbers of 
looters. Though lawlessness had been predicted, troops on the ground were left to deal 
with it without any proper guidance. It was a void that encouraged ill-treatment or at 
best allowed it to flourish.     
 
Of course, such cases do not prove the existence of a policy of abusive conduct that 
might provoke a charge of command responsibility. But they were and are relevant to 
the adequacy and appropriateness of planning for post-war occupation. And at the 
very least they raise serious questions of the quality and character of control and 
command exercised over the forces sent to liberate the people (and not simply the 
territory) of Iraq. Given the Report’s attention to the minutiae of governmental 
discussions, it is strange that matters directly impacting on the lives of Iraqis should 
be effectively ignored.  
 
The incongruity is amplified by the topic of the treatment of detainees. There is an 
important difference between deciding not to examine this matter for good reasons 
(prejudicing other inquiries) and representing it in such neutral terms as to indicate no 
concerns need be inferred. This has the effect of erasing critique aimed at the higher 
echelons of decision makers. It leaves consideration of failures of planning and 
operations incomplete and any attendant legal responsibility unexamined.  
 
The absence of reference in the Report to all the evidence given to the Inquiry by 
Kevin Hurley, Assistant Commander of the Metropolitan Police, is particularly 
egregious. Hurley, a senior member of the Territorial Army as well as a police officer 
of long standing, served two terms in Iraq between 2003 and 2004. He told the 
Inquiry about his experiences in Camp Bucca, a detention centre outside Basra. He 
said about 7000 prisoners were held ‘in a dozen barbed wire enclosures... set up in the 
middle of the desert’ with ‘no running water or sewerage provision. Poisonous snakes 
and rats were everywhere.’ The camp was run by both British and American 
personnel. ‘It was immediately apparent to me,’ Hurley said, ‘that we had almost no 
idea why many of the prisoners were in custody.’ There were young children amongst 
them, 10 or 11 years old. ‘At one stage,’ Hurley said, ‘I had to intervene to have these 
children properly cared for. On a number of occasions I spoke with UK officers about 
the insensitive and arrogant way they dealt with prisoners. I had a pointed discussion 
with a barrister in the UK Army Legal Services who had been particularly rude and 
bigoted in the treatment of detainees.’ Hurley’s final assessment as ‘a career 
policeman with many years of senior investigative experience’ was disappointment at 
‘how little thought had been given to the issues of prisoner management in terms of 
provision of basic rights, dignity and influencing their decision whether to talk to us. 
It was clear to me that the damaging impact on community confidence in the 
Coalition of our poor treatment of many thousands of detained persons was going to 
be profound.’7 
 
It is the testimony of only one man, but that alone should not have seen it so easily 
ignored. The International Committee of the Red Cross supported the accusations 
against the British, as was leaked to the media as early as 2004. But if one only reads 
the Chilcot Report, one would be forgiven for thinking the Americans were wholly 
responsible for this particular debacle. The scandal of the ill-treatment of Iraqi 
prisoners in Abu Ghraib receives repeated mention. Reference is made to the evidence 
of Major General Andrew Stewart, ‘one of several witnesses who told the Inquiry that 
the pictures of Abu Ghraib had had a “significant effect” on MND(SE), where the 
public began turning against Coalition Forces.’8 The Report’s Executive Summary 
highlights that ‘the significant worsening of security, coupled with revelations of 
abuse by members of the US military of Iraqi detainees held in Abu Ghraib prison, led 
many of the Inquiry’s witnesses to conclude that the spring of 2004 had been a 
turning point.’  
 
British complicity in these widespread detention practices is so understated as to be 
easily missed. The Report notes that allegations ‘of abuse of Iraqi detainees by British 
Service Personnel also began to emerge in early 2004’ and records that ‘[a]lmost 
immediately following the Abu Ghraib revelations, on 1 May the Daily Mirror 
published photographs which appeared to show UK troops torturing an Iraqi detainee. 
It was later established that those photographs were fake.’9 But many other allegations 
were not ‘fake’ nor were the photographs taken at Camp Breadbasket. Nor were many 
of the allegations then emerging from the Baha Mousa case.  
 
The Report provides little information on these matters or the clear legal requirements 
for the treatment of civilian detainees under the Geneva Conventions. It mentions that 
in 2003 ‘Cabinet discussed prisoner abuse on 6 May, when Mr Blair told attendees 
that allegations against British troops were being investigated fully’ and that later that 
month the Cabinet was told about the International Committee of the Red Cross’s 
interim report on detention in Iraq which condemned the Coalition’s treatment of 
prisoners. But this is largely the extent of revelation. No substantive comment on the 
failure to prepare for an obvious problem (that of general policing and also interning 
thousands of Iraqis and obtaining intelligence from them) appears. 
 
Of course, this might be excused by the decision to exclude some of these matters 
from the Inquiry’s terms of reference. But the failure to drill down to the detail of 
occupation as it impacted on many Iraqi civilians and what this entailed in terms of 
military practices in comparison with legal commitments is extraordinary. Preference 
is given to high level political and governmental activities, which can only ever be a 
part of the story when assessing the effects of the decision to invade and occupy 
another nation. The Inquiry may have been bereft of legal expertise (something that 
could have been remedied) but a lack of reference to these matters prevents 
judgement on the quality of the neglect (and perhaps disdain for those Iraqis who 
were being saved from a human rights abusing regime) that is otherwise condemned 
in the Report.   
 
Conclusion 
 
The Chilcot Report suffered from the enormity of its task. That is clear from the years 
it has taken for its publication. It did not have unlimited resources and its mandate 
was restricted accordingly. International law, in the decision to go to war and the 
conduct of the military invasion and occupation, is vital in providing the standards by 
which the actions of those who brought this about or tried to implement decisions 
should be judged. The Report did not consider these matters in great depth. It leaves a 
distinct hole in analysis that remains to be filled.  
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